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Abstract 
Past literature indicates that family firms were different from nonfamily firms in term 
of performance, governess and disclosure. But there was very little evidence which 
specify the financial structure of family firm. Maturity and leverage, two proxies are 
used to examine the financial structure of family firm in this particular study. This study 
shows that family firms are different from non-family firms in terms of debt maturity 
and leverage. Moreover, transparency is negatively related to maturity which indicate 
that more transparency decrease maturity, while family firms has more debt maturity 
which suggested that family firms are more relying on long-term debt and there is 
chance of expropriation in family firms due to less transparency. Furthermore, 
transparency is positively related with leverage which indicate that more transparency 
increase leverage ,  while family firms also have positive relationship with leverage 
which specify that more transparency leads family firms financial structure more 
toward debt. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is frequently accepted that recent financial crisis in Asia did not happen due to lack 
in investors’ confidence only, but interestingly, it was also the cause of operative 
corporate governance deficiency or transparency factor in many operating financial 
markets of Asia, including individual or family firms on other side. In preceding years, 
the regulatory frameworks of economies in East Asia are being reviewed and improved, 
predominantly in the areas of corporate governance, disclosures, financing choices and 
transparency, both in terms of public or family corporations (Ho & Wong, 2001).     
Economic development view, based on the culture of strong family ties, is not recent 
and new. The view is linked with the first introductory essay introduced by Max Weber 
(1904), indicating the values of culturally robust and predetermined family firms can 
stopover the development activities of capitalist economies. These economies are 
dependent mostly on the form of individualist economy and the lack of nepotism. 
Banfield (1958) presented another view on this cultural aspect. He specified ‘amoral 
familism’ as the key source of two factors in the south region of Italy; one is the smaller 
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size of firm on average and other is sluggish development of south economy in Italy as 
compared to north. Similarly, another research by Fukuyama (1995) gave origin to the 
parallel argument. He identified the societies with people who teach their networks to 
trust close family relations on one side, plus they also teach their people to distrust those 
networks who are outside their family on another side. It impedes formal institutions to 
develop in the society. This cultural aspect impedes the emergence of suboptimal 
economic corporations, where parents put their effort on keeping the family business 
operated. The reasons of such decision may depend on the solid sense of responsibility 
towards other members of the family or it may be a self-centred desire to call their 
family business a family legacy.      
The area of family business directs the attention towards family firm control notion. 
The control of family firm is identified to be a vital matter in extenuating interests’ 
conflicts between shareholders and managers, on the issue of control and ownership 
separation (Anderson et al., 2003; Claessens et al., 2000; Fama and Jensen, 1983; La 
Porta et al., 2000). The firms being controlled by family commonly rely themselves on 
family legacy notion, or they tend to pass their firm business from generation to next 
generation. On contrary, Yeh et al. (2001) gave another idea that major shareholders in 
family controlled businesses tend to force the company to embrace the policies based 
on their personal safeties, instead of other minority holders. This indicates the tough 
side of family firms, as they not only deal with regular requirements as well as 
opportunities of their family businesses, but they also have to focus specifically on the 
needs and desires of the owners in family firms. 
  
Family controlled firms can be categorized over two broad explanation of theories; (1) 
private control benefits, and (2) competitive advantage, private control benefits. Both 
are different mainly because of shareholders’ group for whom firms tend to maximize 
value. The assumption of private control benefits states that value maximization factor 
is only available for family controlled firms who tend to expropriate investors in non-
family publicly traded firms (Burkart et al., 2003). Such investors are better off in 
family firms as minority shareholders instead of being in non-family firms, but they are 
worse off if family ownership in firm decide to maximize value for all shareholders of 
the firm instead of self-concern. On contrary, the hypothesis of competitive advantage 
states that value for shareholders is maximized for both family controlled firms or non-
family publicly traded firms (Bertrand &Schoar, 2006). In simple words, both 
explanations contribute to economic efficiency but only the assumption of competitive 
advantage let the value and profit factor of the firm to reflect full reimbursements to all 
shareholders. 
Surprisingly, though family controlled firms are largely a recent growing target of 
interest, still financing choice of these family firms has limited research. The rareness 
of research let the researchers to direct their attention towards agency conflicts exists 
in the family firms and affects the financing decisions and financial structure of firms 
(Jensen &Meckling, 1976; Berger et al., 1997). Moreover, family firms have greater 
potential to expropriate minority shareholders or investors as distinction to non-family 
firms. Therefore, the different financing structures of family and non-family should also 
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the part researched literature onwards. Moreover, along the financing decisions and 
structures of the firms, the information content assumption has a key role in financing 
choices of businesses. A noteworthy literature indicates that relative cot of dispensing 
various securities is affected by information environment and ultimately affecting the 
capital structure of family firms. This is because capital structure identifies the outsiders’ 
ability to gather information and control or govern the managers (Agarwal & O’Hara, 
2007; Bharath et al., 2009; Moerman, 2009). However, generally the cost of capital of 
non-family and family firms is likely to be affected by information environment, but 
particularly, the cost of capital in family firms are reduced to margins by greater 
transparency factor, due to greater potential of expropriation in family controlled firms. 
This ultimately causes the financial structures of family firms to be highly influenced 
by transparency.  
Theories states that family controlled firms when more likely focus on expropriation, 
they will have to depend on the deft financing choice of financing structure more 
(Grossman & Hart, 1982; Jensen, 1986). This is because of the fact that management is 
difficult to be managed by shareholders due to the problem of free-riders, but it claimed 
hardly that debt can reduce resources misuse. Further, it is also expected by the 
researches of Harris &Raviv (1990) and Diamond (1991) that family firms will tend to 
depend on short term debt more relative to long term debt if they possess greater agency 
conflicts. Therefore, it is assumed that for any given transparency level, there will be 
higher leverage ratios and lower maturity of debt. Afterward, reducing expropriation 
scope will improve transparency and this transparency will ultimately cause family 
firms to reduce their overall debt financing by issuing equity more and also to upsurge 
their debt maturity structure. Similarly, the enhancement in transparency will affect the 
financing structures’ elements of family controlled firms much more than non-family 
public firms.  
The firm transparency is stated as the extent or potential of outsiders to evaluate the 
operations of firms. In some scenarios it is quite beneficial for firms to have 
transparency factor and welcome the examination of outsiders. However, it cannot be 
the case in other scenarios. The study tends to focus specifically on the fact that when 
family firms’ prospects depending on long period relations with stakeholders, the 
examination of external outsiders generate costs that reduce value of firms. 
Transparency mechanism is an important in corporate governance studies and it is 
studied in the form of financial and accounting reporting or voluntary disclosures. 
Traditionally, agency theory perspective has been researched for transparency, whereby 
the voluntary disclosure perspective of transparency to shareholders is recently getting 
much attention for aligning the interests of managers and shareholders in family or non-
family firms (Healy et al., 1999; Hermanson, 2000; Bushman and Smith, 2001). 
Significance 
The underlying study will investigate the transparency perspective and financing 
choices perspective of family controlled firms. The study will provide insight regarding 
the financing choice decisions and financial structures of the family controlled firms or 
small businesses. Therefore, the current study will be beneficial for both academics and 
practitioners. The idea of family controlled businesses or firms are a new notion in 
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developing countries like Pakistan. The study will make various contributions to 
literature. Previous literature has highlighted various characteristics of family 
controlled businesses. However, very less research in developing countries has been 
carried out regarding family ownership and its capital structure decisions. Therefore, 
the preceding research will expand the literature by investigating lower debt maturity 
level and low leverage levels of family firms operating in Pakistan as compared to non-
family firms. Additionally, the study tends to link expensive external finance with 
potential for minority stakeholders’ expropriation, carried by corporate insiders, in 
situations of divergence of ownership and control rights. Moreover, how the opacity of 
information content environment will affect the respective relation will contribute to 
literature. Based on the described contributions, the study will focus on the following 
objectives; 
The objective of the study highlights the following aspects for underlying study; 
 The study intends to investigate the differences in the financing choices 
and financial structures of family and non-family firms. 
 The study also intends to describe the transparency measures of family 
as well as non-family firms according to the financing choices (leverage 
and debt maturity) 
The relevant objectives identify following research questions to be studied further. 
These research questions provide the door to carry the objectives up to the level of 
investigation. Subsequent questions are; 
1. Does family and non-family firms are different from each other in terms 
of their financial structure (leverage and debt maturity)? 
2. Does family firms are more transparent than non-family firms? 
3. Does financial structure (leverage and debt maturity) of family and non-
family firms changes in response to transparency? 
 
 Section I was based on the introduction chapter. The next Section II will cover the 
literature review of previous researches. Section III will follow Theoretical, Conceptual 
Framework and Hypothesis Development. The methodology chapter is discussed in 
section IV. The results and discussion Sections of methodology based research will be 




The recent crisis in East Asia raises questions regarding the environments of corporate 
governance, voluntary disclosures and transparency in terms of generating reliable and 
relevant information. Corporate governance has been viewed as the mathematical 
structures or devices that tend to check the self-centred behaviour of managers (John 
&Senbet, 1998). However, corporate governance has also been argued to be the act of 
restricting managers from expropriating the shareholders or minority investors (Mitton, 
2002). The literature of current study sheds the light on the studies of transparency and 
financing choices of family and non-family firms, conducted by previous researches 
over the period of time. 
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Family Firms and Corporate Transparency 
The family ownership has a key importance in terms of mitigating agency problems, 
caused by the separation of management and family ownership interests (Jensen 
&Meckling (1976). This issue is specifically addressed by controlling family firms by 
reducing the conflicts between managers and owner in two ways; (1) direct appointment 
of any family member on the position of CEO to keep family legacy over long term 
horizon, and (2) the effective monitoring and supervision of professional executives of 
the firm, referred to as monitor-in-place argument (Demsetz& Lehn, 1985). Another 
case indicates the position of controlling shareholders in substantial ownership of firms, 
in order to derive benefits over minority shareholders’ expense, referred as 
expropriation dispute. For instance, family members can take the right to engage in the 
transactions of interrelated party (Anderson &Reeb, 2003), issuing unusual dividends 
(DeAngelo&DeAngelo, 2000), freezing out of minority shareholders (Gilson & Gordon, 
2003), or obtaining excessive gains from insider trading (Anderson et al., 2012).  
The expropriation argument, on another side, states that family firms can face lesser 
corporate transparency if minority shareholders are expropriated by controlling 
shareholders. However, empirical evidence gives mixed results. Wang (2006) and Ali 
et al. (2007) worked on S&P 500 index family firms and explained that these firms have 
better quality of financial reporting, increased analyst coverage and reduced bid-ask 
spreads. Also, Ali et al. (2007) was of the view that in S&P 500 family firms have 
greater transparency, but this transparency diminishes outside S&P 500 firms.  
However, Chen et al. (2008) stated that family firms of S&P 1500 tend to provide fewer 
disclosures like earnings forecast or conference calls. On contrary, Anderson et al. 
(2009) described family firms to be more opaque compared to non-family firms, among 
the 2000 leading industrial firms of U.S. These mixed results confirm both monitor-in-
place and expropriation arguments in their respective places. These outcomes, however, 
at first instinct appears to be conflicting, but they can be explained in a way that 
disclosure incentives of family firms are affected more by firm size relative to non-
family firms. Moreover, Anderson et al. (2009) stated that family firms in S&P 500 with 
greater family ownership possess greater Tobin’s Q as compared to non-family entities. 
Yet, no value premium had been reported outside these high transparent entities.  
The general as well as specific literature is present regarding transparency effects on 
firm value. It requires the examination of link between information generation and 
capital structure. Easterbrook (1984) particularly argued that family firms are subjected 
to increased examination when they are enforced to pay high segment of their cash 
flows, because of their need for external capital. Such investigation ultimately benefits 
family firms in the form of reducing agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. Jensens (1986) argument of free cash flows also implicitly explains the 
investigation of family firms associated with existing debt’s renegotiations and 
refinancing. The argument states that negative NPV investments are difficult to carry 
due to high level of leverage and it cannot be internally financed. Another study 
conducted by Holmstrom&Tirole (1993) examined the relationship between structure 
of capital and firm securities’ liquidity. The study also examined that different 
incentives are produced by various capital structures for generating the firm’s 
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information. The outcomes showed that firm value is improved by high transparency.   
Financing choices of Family firms 
A brief literature is present on family firms’ structure of capital and financing choices.   
Anderson &Reeb (2003) conducted study on S&P 500 firms and investigated the effect 
of family firms, ownership shares and CEO status (founder, heir or hired) on firm 
leverage ratios. No difference was reported between the leverage of family and non-
family firms. Similarly, Anderson et al. (2003) examined directly the effects of founding 
family ownership on cost of debt. The outcomes described that family firms have lower 
financing of cost of debt as compared to non-family firms and less cost of debt lowers 
the agency costs of founding family firms, considering firm relevant and industry 
characteristics.  
The financing choices of founding family controlled firms are likely to be affected by 
higher risk of expropriation as compared to non-family firms. The arguments presented 
by Jensen &Meckling (1976) and Grossman & Hart (1982) suggested that agency costs 
of family firms linked with equity financing can be reduced if they depend more on 
debt financing. Moreover, the members of founding families have incentives to employ 
higher debt financing over equity one. This is done in order to avoid the risk of their 
ownership liquidation (Anderson &Reeb, 2003). Further, based on debt financing even, 
Harris &Raviv (1990), Diamond (1991) and Stulz (2000) implied that arguments that 
short term financing will be more followed by family firms if well-timed information 
is demanded by the creditors. Additionally, management in family firms is disciplined 
by the mechanisms of liquidation and intervention threat. These mechanisms also 
enable the lenders to recover value from firm’s investments. However, additional costs 
can occur due to overreliance on certain finance types. For instance, liquidity risk can 
occur due to increased short term debt (Diamond, 1991). Similarly, increased long term 
debt financing over equity financing and greater level of leverage ratios can cause 
overhang debt or increased indirect financial distress costs. 
Debt Maturity 
The determinants and theories structure of debt maturity present a sizeable literature.    
Stulz (2000) argued that management can be monitored effectively through short term 
debt financing. The arguments base on the concepts that in case of less transparency of 
family firms, the information or agency issues can be mitigated by short term debt 
financing. However, the dark side of short term debt was also examined (Rajan, 1992). 
When a firm’s information is attained by lenders, the respective information can be 
used to threaten liquidation due to insufficient cash flows. Such situation creates the 
problem of information monopoly. In respective situations, incentives of ex ante effort 
can be distorted by the threat of liquidation. Diamond (1993) in his study stresses the 
information asymmetry over monitoring. Berger et al. (2005) examined that debt 
maturity levels increases with low asymmetry in information and the results confirmed 
the hypothesis for the sample of large U.S banks’ commercial loans. Moerman (2009) 
investigated secondary market syndicated loans and described that the subsequent debt 
cost issues tend to get affected by bid-ask spreads. The study also reported that more 
asymmetry in information decreases the maturity level of debt.  
The debt financing structure of firms also includes the agency costs issues. Typically, 
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the agency costs of debt are defined in terms of the problem of risk shifting or asset 
substitution. Debt or equity complains have a potential conflict in terms of 
expropriation of wealth of bondholders by controlling shareholders. This is done by 
investments in much riskier new projects, containing risk more than the existing 
projects currently held in the asset portfolio of the firm. Such cases direct much gain to 
shareholders through the payoff of high-risk projects, while most cost is directed to 
debt-holders (Fama& Miller, 1972; Jensen &Meckling, 1976). On contrary, option-
pricing framework can also be used to examine the potential conflict of interest among 
security claimants. Call option or equity holdings, are exercised in cases where the 
value of asset is greater than the debt claim value. The value of option increases by the 
increase in risk of firms, causing a decline in the debt claim value. Moreover, the 
problem of shareholder incentives aroused due to outside debt causes the bondholders 
tend to rely on monitoring devices or defensive covenants for protection from shifts in 
risk. Yet, such contracts are written and enforced on non-trivial costs. Additionally, with 
an increase in agency costs of debt, debt-holders’ required premium also increases. 
Accordingly, high debt costs are faced by the firms due to interest conflicts between 
bondholders and shareholders (Ronald et al., 2002). 
Leverage 
The literature on leverage covers the effects of transparency as well as agency costs on 
firm capital structure. Jensen &Meckling (1976) stated that family firms should reduce 
their agency costs linked with accounting earnings by relying more on the debt 
financing capital structure. Grossman & Hart (1982) described that management can 
mitigate its incentives for cash flow diversion because of control benefits’ loss and 
transparency threat in the presence of debt. Whereas, Jensen (1986) argued that agency 
costs linked with free cash flows can be reduced by debt financing. The information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders in a firm is reduced by corporate 
transparency. Moreover, more transparent firms rely more on debt over equity financing, 
as equity is more sensitive than debt from information perspective (Myers &Majluf, 
1984). Considering the same argument, Chang et al. (2006) studied the higher analyst 
coverage effects of equity on the leverage ratios of the firm, and also on incentive of 
markets timings, equity insurance size and frequency and the choice of debt equity. The 
outcomes of the research showed that higher equity analyst coverage is linked with low 
level of leverage ratios. On contrary, Bharath et al. (2009) presented the measure of 
asymmetry in information based on first prime component of various market adverse 
sections’ microstructure measures. Firms having higher information asymmetry 
examined to have higher ratios of debt.   
Grounded on the rudimentary intuition that firms relations with stakeholders can be 
affected by disclosure of information, the transparency and ultimately leverage seemed 
to be costly, especially when; (1) the development of human capital of certain workers 
and hence their retaining cost, rely on necessary investments that are not contractible, 
(2) the effort of worker is a crucial input and this input effort reduces if workers start 
on believing that their employer will not a leader anymore an (3) firms have 
opportunities of investments dependent on external financing (Andres et al., 2003). 
The relevant previous literature of the study presents mixed and controversial 
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arguments. But still there is always a need of additional research on the subject with the 
additional of important gap. Therefore, the research continues. 
Theoretical, Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development:- 
Theoretical framework: 
Literature review described every aspect of the concepts related to family and non-
family firms’ relationship and their financing choices in the form of maturity level of 
debt or leverage ratios, based on the transparency measures as well. Next step is the 
identification of most relevant literature to the selected variables of current research.  
Conceptual Framework 
 





Past literature indicate that family firms (FF) are negatively related with sale, market 
value (MV) and Return on asset (ROA), suggested that family firms had less market 
value and sale as compare to non-family firms (Anderson et al. 2009).While Cash 
sufficiency (CSUF) and Board Independence1 (BEXE) are positively related with 
Family firms which indicate that family firms have more cash sufficiency and Non-




Prior literature indicates that Transparency (Tp) was positively related with sale, market 
value (MV) and Fixed investment (FINV), suggested that transparency increase market 
value and sale (Anderson et al. 2009). While Cash sufficiency (CSUF) and Board 
Independence1 (BEXE) were negatively related with Transparency which indicate that 





Both theories are available in prior literatures which indicate that Transparency (Tp) 
was positively and negatively related with Maturity (MATU) which point out that when 
transparency increases, long term liabilities increases and when transparency decreases 
maturity also decreases (Faccio et al 2001). 
Family firms also had two expectations regarding long term liabilities which indicate 
that family firms were more or less rely on long term debt. (Anderson et al. 2009). 




Both theories are available in prior literature which indicates that Transparency (Tp)  
positively and negatively related with leverage (LEVE) which specify that when 
transparency increase family firms move toward debts, and when transparency 
decreases family firms move toward Equity financing. (Faccio et al., 2001). 
Family firms also had two expectations regarding Leverage which indicate that family 
firms are more or less rely on leverage, moreover when transparency increases family 
firms more move toward leverage and vice versa. (Anderson et al. 2009). While all 
other variables show positive relationship with Maturity. 
Hypothesis Development 
The literature described above reflects the differences in the potential of expropriation 
or agency conflicts of interest between families controlled as well as non-family firms. 
It is also examined that information asymmetry based on the transparency concept is 
generally related to the financing and capital structure choices of family controlled 
firms. Therefore, the hypotheses of present study are developed on the notion of 
difference of financing structures and choices of family and non-family firms for a level 
of transparency and how these differences tend to affect changes in transparency 





Family Firms and non-family firms are different from each other. 
H2: 
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Family firms and non-family firms have significant different financial structure.  
H3: 
There is no significant relationship between transparency and financial structure of 
Family firms. 
H4: 
There is a significant positive relationship between transparency and debt maturity of 
Family firms. 
H5: 
For a given level of transparency, family firms have higher debt maturity and   lower 
Leverage ratio. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample selection and data collection: 
The current study is an explanatory study based on quantitative research. Population is 
all non-financial companies listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE).Multistage 
Sampling technique is used in this particular study to select sample. First Stratified 
random sampling is used;while all non-financial sector of Pakistan stock exchange is 
used as stratum, further Proportionate stratified Random Sampling is used in which 
the sample size of each stratum is proportionate of total population size.Moreover 
convenience sampling is used to select family firm in each stratum. Eighty 
manufacturing companies listed on PSE is the sample of this study.Six years’ data is 
used for analysis, which is from Jan 1, 2009 to Dec 31, 2014. 
 SBP data index and open door is used for the collection of financial statement data, 
while closing price data is collected from PSE.MS Excel 2013 and STATA 12is used as 
Data Analysis Software. 
Regression models 
An important variable of the current study is family firm. Family firms are defined to 
be the firms having ownership control on the firm. Such firms tend to keep their family 
legacy by transferring their business to next generations. Logistic regression is used to 
predict Model 1, as earlier research indicates that when variable depended is binary 
used logistic regression (David W, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 2013). 
            it 0 1 it 2 it 4 it 5 it 6 it itFF β β SALE β MV β ROA β BEXE β CSUF U  
Where  
FFit = Family Firms each firm i at time t.  
MVit= Market value each firm i at time t. 
ROAit= Return on Assets each firm i at time t. 
BEXEit= Board Independence1 each firm i at time t. 
U it each firm i at time t. 
Another noteworthy variable of study is transparency. Transparency is described as the 
extent to which the outsiders are able to examine or investigate the actions of the firms. 
It is also considered as the perceived quality of information shared publically and 
internationally from the firms (Writtenberg-Moermen 2009). To see the impact of Tp 





                it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it 7 it itTp β β Sale β MV β FINV β AEAR β FF β BEXE β CSUF U  
Where  
Tpit = Transparency each firm i at time t.  
MVit= Market value each firm i at time t.   
FINVit = Fixed Investment each firm i at time t. 
AEARit = Abnormal Earnings each firm i at time t. 
FFit = Family Firms each firm i at time t. 
BEXEit = Board Independence1 each firm i at time t. 
CSUFit = Cash sufficiency each firm i at time t. 
U it= Error of each firm i at time t. 
Debt maturity is another variable based on the financing choices of family control firms 
or non-family publically traded firms. Debt maturity indicates the maturity date under 
which the principal is due to be paid. This term is applicable to any form of instrument 
of finance that requires the payment of loan on the fixed determined date (Datta et al 
2005). 
                         it 0 0 it 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it 7 it itMATU α αTp δFF Tp β FF β Sale β MV β ROA β CFO β FF β VOLT β CSUF U  
where  
MATUit = Maturity each firm i at time t. 
FFit= Family Firms each firm i at time t.  
MVit= Market value each firm i at time t.  
ROAit= Return on Assets each firm i at time t.  
CFOit= Cash flow from operating activities each firm i at time t.  
TP= Transparency each firm i at time t.  
CSUFit= Cash sufficiency each firm i at time t.  
U it= Error of each firm i at time t. 
Last variable is also related with financing choice of capital structure, called leverage. 
Leverage is defined as the debt amount that firms tend to use in order to purchase further 
assets. Therefore, it indicates the degree to which a firm exploits its fixed income 
securities, like preferred equity or debt (Chen, Dasgupta, and Yu 2014). 
 
                       it 0 0 it 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it itLEVE α αTp δFF Tp β FF β Sale β MV β ROA β VOLT β FF β MATU U  
where 
LEVE= Leverage  
FFit= Family Firms each firm i at time t. 
MVit= Market value each firm i at time t.  
ROAit= Return on Assets each firm i at time t.  




Results and Discussion 
eISBN 978-967-0910-76-5 1071
Summary statistic off all variables presented in table 1, including its mean, Standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values.  This study includes six-year annual data 
for eighty companies which are from 2009 -2014. Total number of observation is 6x80= 
480.  
Total fifteen variables are included in summery statistics.  The mean value of Sale is 
23.0866% which indicate that on average every company generate twenty-three percent 
of revenue from net sale. While minimum value is 16.77 percent and maximum 
27.97.MV is 22.4965% on average while minimum and maximum value are 18.19 and 
27.74. Mean profit value indicates that on average every company generate .4142 
percent profit. Mean value of (LEVE) .4581 suggest that significant portion of family 
firms are financed by leverage. (MATU) meanvalue indicate that on average .07424 
percent family firms have long term finances above then one year. While minimum and 
maximum valuesare-.00676,2.9073 respectively. (BIND), (BEXE) mean value indicate 
on average every firm have .1931,5502 independent and non-executive directors 
respectively. 
Standard deviation values suggest that all variable values are normally distributed and 
standard deviation is close to their mean, while only (Tp) value show extreme value in 
all variables. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sale 480 23.0866 1.7172 16.7794 27.9743 
MV 480 22.4965 1.7313 18.1921 27.7476 
PROF 480 .4142 .9395 -1.1136 8.9285 
VOLT 480 1.1222 1.0414 .03503 4.9239 
BIND 480 .19317 .1062 0 .5714 
BEXE 480 .5502 .14185 .1111 1 
CFO 480 .1657 .8335 -9.6887 6.8473 
FF 480 .7687 .4220 0    1 
ROA 480 .19127 .5778 -2.111 4.2352 
AEAR 480 -.0075 1.0998 -11.4840 9.7286 
MATU 480 .07424 .2627 -.00676 2.9073 
FINV 480 -.0779 .2181 -1.6214 1.2658 
Tp 480 1.1057 4.6304 .1548 36 
CSUF 480 .7645 .4247 0     1 
LEVE 480 .4581 .3247 .0004 .9946 
 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics for Family firms and Nonfamily firms, 
including mean and standard deviation which shows the difference between these two. 
Results indicated that on average Family firms have high (leverage) ratio and lower 
(maturity) as compare to Nonfamily firms which indicate that family firms capital 
structure are more toward debt. Further table indicate that family firms have more 
(transparency) and (BIND) as compare to non-family firms, indicate that family firms 
are more information asymmetry and transparent and have more independent directors. 
These results are very similar to (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) results.  
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As expected  (Sale) and (MV)  is higher for Non family firms,which specify that non 
family firms holds large percentage of market. Finaly results indicte that Family firms 
have  more (VOLT) and rely more on (FINV) moreover it reports less deficit  as 
compare to non family firms These above results are compareable to those previous  
studies . (e.g.,Datta et al 2005). 
While non-family firms shows more (ROA) and (PROF) which indicate that non-family 
firms on average earn more profit because Non- family firms have more market value 
and sale as compare to non-family firms. 
Stander deviation values suggest all variable values of family and non-family firms are 
normally distributed and its standard deviation is close to their mean while only 
(Tp),(CFO)  value show extreme value in all variables .which indicate that these 
variables have extreme values. 
Table 2: Difference of mean and standard deviation test for Family and Non-family 
firms 
Variables Family Firms Non-Family Firms 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Sale 22.8847 1.5976 23.7577 1.9264 
MV 22.2939 1.6332 23.1701 1.8798 
PROF .3892 .8419 .4972 1.2097 
BIND .1914 .1070 .1988 .1039 
BEXE .5439 .1393 .5712 .1486 
CFO .1414 .4941 .2466 1.4833 
ROA .1859 .5450 .2090 .6778 
AEAR -.0018 1.2484 -.0265 .2311 
MATU .07504 .2883 .07400 .1501 
TP 1.9684 6.8056 .8461 3.711 
CSUF .7777 .4163 .7207 .4506 
LEVE .4844 .3196 .3710 .3278 
VOLT 1.1402 1.0635 1.0625 .9664 
FINV -.0847 .2101 -.0555 .2424 
 
Logistic regression is used to predict results in table 3, as earlier research indicates that 
when dependent variable is binary used logistic regression (David W, Lemeshow, and 
Sturdivant 2013). 
As per the logistic regression, results indicate that the total number of observations is 
480. The Prob> chi2 value for fowling model is 0.0000 which is less than the 0.05 so it 
is found that the model is significant and correct. As per model 72.4% variations in 
family firms are explained by independent variable. 
The coefficient value for Sale shows negative relationship among (Sale) and family 
firm, suggesting that when (Sale) change by 1% family firms sale decrease by -0.227%, 
which specify that family firms has less sale. 
 The (MV) coefficient value shows negative relationship suggesting that when (MV) 
change by 1% market value of family firms decreases by -.1856817% whichspecify that 
family firms has low market value. Coefficient value of (BEXE) also shows negative 
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relationship among family firm which propose that family firms has less Non-executive 
directors so that family firms are less transparent. 
While (CSUF) coefficient shows positive relation which indicates that when (CSUF) 
change by 1% family firm cash flows tend to change by 0.523%,which shows that 
family firms generate more cash flows from operating activities. While its individual 
regression with family firm result shows insignificant ‘p’ value indicate that another 
mediator variable affects it and make this variable significant in regression model. 
Following results are in accordance with the results of previous research (Anderson et 
al 2012). 
Table 3:Relationship between family firm and independent variables 
VARIABLES FF FF FF FF FF FF 
              
Sale -0.227*** -0.325***     
 (0.0819) (0.0707)     
MV -0.210***  -0.299***    
 (0.0802)  (0.0656)    
ROA 0.106   -0.0676   
 (0.201)   (0.182)   
BEXE -1.658**    -1.364*  
 (0.805)    (0.770)  
CSUF 0.523**     0.305 
 (0.261)     (0.246) 
Constant 11.77*** 8.783*** 7.998*** 1.215*** 1.962*** 0.973***
 (1.928) (1.669) (1.508) (0.114) (0.448) (0.211) 
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 
R-Squared 0.0724 0.0449 0.0424 0.0003 0.0061 0.0029 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1 
 
Table 4: correlation between family firms and independent variables 
 Family~m Sale MV ROA BEXE CSUF 
FF 1.0000      
Sale -0.2146 1.0000     
MV -0.2136 0.0539 1.0000    
ROA -0.0169 0.0659 0.1271 1.0000   
BEXE -0.0811 -0.0523 -0.0279 0.0102 1.0000  
CSUF 0.0567 0.1176 0.1096 -0.0667 0.0060 1.0000 
 
Above table shows correlation between family firms and other independent variables. 
CSUF and family firms show moderate uphill relationship which suggest that changes 
in CSUF and family firm tend to move together. While all other variable shows a weak 
downhill (negative) linear relationship which indicate that when one variable increases 
other variable decrease and they capture other different aspects of family firm. 
(Muti and Pfaffermayr 2011)Husman, ( Breusch and Pagan1980) Lagrange multiplier 
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study indicate that OLS regression is most suitable for this particular study. As per OLS 
regression, results indicate that the total number of observations is 449. The Prob> chi2 
value for fowling model is 0.0000 which is less than the 0.05 so it is found that the 
model is significant and correct. As per r-squared value 0.051% variations in 
Transparency are explained by following independent variables. 
The (MV) coefficient value shows positive relationship suggesting that when (MV) 
change by 1% transparency increased by 0.0102% which specify that more sale increase 
transparency. Coefficient value of BEXE shows negative relationship among 
transparency, which suggest that more non-executive directors decrease transparency. 
Sales coefficient shows positive relationship with transparency which indicate if sale 
change by 1%, transparency increases by 0.00903 suggest that more sale increase 
transparency. Family firm’s shows positive relationship in regression model with 
transparency which indicate that family firms increase transparency, while its individual 
regression result show negative relation with transparency, suggesting that there is 
another mediator variable which effect their result. 
While CSUF coefficient shows negative relation, which indicates that when CSUF 
change by 1% (Tp) decrease by 0.523%, which indicate that (Tp), decrease more cash 
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flows from operating activities. While its individual regression with family firm result shows insignificant ‘p’ value which indicates that another 
mediator variable affects him and make this variable significant in regression model. These results are in accordance with past studies (Chen, 
Dasgupta, and Yu 2014). 
Table 5:-Relationship between Transparency and independent Variables 
 
VARIABLES Tp tp Tp Tp Tp Tp Tp Tp Tp 
Sale 0.00903*** 0.0127***        
 (0.00310) (0.00268)        
MV 0.0102***   0.0133***      
 (0.00293)   (0.00257)      
BEXE -0.178***    
-
0.175***     
 (0.0309)    (0.0316)     
FINV 0.0462**     0.0169**    
 (0.0230)     (0.0242)    
FF 0.0152**      
-
0.00804**   
 (0.0206)      (0.0178)   
CSUF -0.0203**       -0.0112  
 (0.0101)       (0.0106)  
AEAR 0.00260        0.00222 
 (0.00373)        (0.00399)
Constant 0.143* 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.177*** 0.572*** 0.477*** 0.476*** 0.484*** 0.476*** 
 (0.0750) (0.0623) (0.0623) (0.0581) (0.0179) (0.00482) (0.00951) (0.00931) (0.00451)
Observations 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 
R-squared 0.051 0.038 0.041 0.0056 0.0064 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 
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Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *  p<0.1 
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Table 6: Correlation between Transparency and independent Variables.  
 Tp Sale MV BEXE FINV FF CSUF AEAR 
Tp 1.0000        
Sale 0.2194 1.0000       
MV 0.2367 0.4281 1.0000      
BEXE -0.2539 -0.0272 -0.0148 1.0000     
FINV 0.0329 -0.1098 -0.0363 0.1577 1.0000    
FF -0.0035 -0.2765 -0.2419 -0.0834 -0.0235 1.0000   
CSUF -0.0496 0.1440 0.1216 -0.0062 -0.0966 0.0300 1.0000  
AEAR 0.0263 0.0810 -0.0059 0.0452 -0.0080 0.0055 0.0452 1.0000 
 
Correlation between Tp, Sale, MV,FINV shows a weak uphill (positive) linear 
relationship, suggesting that tp and all these variable tend to decrease or increase 
together. While all other variables show a weak downhill (negative) , linear relationship, 
which indicate that when one variable increase other variable decrease. 
Correlation between Tp, Sale, MV,FINV shows a weak uphill (positive) linear 
relationship, suggesting that tp and all these variable tend to decrease or increase 
together. While all other variables show a weak downhill (negative) , linear relationship, 
which indicate that when one variable increase other variable decrease. 
Estimation results for Model 3 are presented in table 7. (Muti and Pfaffermayr 
2011)Husman,(Breusch and Pagan1980) Lagrange multiplier study indicate that OLS 
Regression is most suitable for this particular study. 
As per OLS regression, results indicate that the total number of observations is 466. 
The Prob> chi2 value for fowling model is 0.0000 which is less than the 0.05 so it is 
found that the model is significant and correct. As per r-squared value 54.6% variations 
in Maturity is explained by following independent variables.  
Coefficient of transparency show negative relationship with maturity, suggesting that 
when (Tp) change by 1% debt maturity decreases by -0.0562%, which specifies that 
more transparency decrease debt maturity,  
Coefficient value of family firms show positive relationship among family firm and 
debt Maturity which specify that 1% change in family firm observed 0.0236% positive 
changes in debt Maturity, which means that family firms have more debt maturity.  
These results also indicate that Family firms are less transparent, so that there is chance 
of expropriation in family firms. These results are comparable to those of prior studies. 
(e.g., Writtenberg-Moermen 2009),( Faccio, Lang, and Young2001). 
The (MV) coefficient value shows positive relationship suggesting that when (MV) 
change by 1% debt maturity increased by 0.00731 which specify more market value 
increase debt maturity 
Coefficient value of Sale also shows positive relationship among transparency, which 
propose that more sale increase debt maturity. While all other variable results are 




Table 7: Effect of Family firm on the relationship between Maturity and corporate Transparency 
VARIABLES MATU MATU MATU MATU MATU MATU MATU MATU MATU MATU 
Tp -0.0562** -0.0471**         
 (0.00426) (0.00312)         
FF 0.0236***  
 
0.0300***        
 (0.0113)  (0.0103)        
CSUF 0.000275   0.00502       
 (0.0101)   (0.0103)       
MV 0.00731**    0.00911***      
 (0.00285)    (0.00253)      
Sale 
-
0.00648**     0.00156     
 (0.00291)     (0.00257)     
ROA 0.0505***      0.0525***    
 (0.00768)      (0.00789)    
CFO 0.0271***       0.0306***   
 (0.00639)       (0.00631)   
Tf 0.00134        -0.00710*  
 (0.00588)        (0.00428)  
VOLT -0.00274         -0.00340 
 (0.00394)         (0.00422) 
Constant 0.0363 0.0431*** 0.0629*** 0.0360*** -0.165*** 0.00374 0.0309*** 0.0348*** 0.0432*** 0.0436***
 (0.0711) (0.00490) (0.00905) (0.00904) (0.0570) (0.0594) (0.00441) (0.00441) (0.00484) (0.00646) 
Observations 466 466 466 466 466 466 466 466 466 466 
R-squared 0.546 0.251 0.018 0.192 0.271 0.162 0.087 0.048 0.006 0.001 
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Standard errors in parentheses, ***p <.01, **p < 0.05, *p<.01 
Table 8: Shows correlation between effect of Family firm on the relationship between Maturity and corporate Transparency 
 
 MATU Tp FF CSUF MV Sale ROA CFO Tf VOLT 
MATU 1.0000          
Tp -0.0700 1.0000         
FF 0.1337 - 0.1031 1.0000        
CSUF 0.0225 0.0010 0.0540 1.0000       
MV 0.1649 -0.1230 -0.2191 0.1025 1.0000      
Sale 0.0282 -0.2152 -0.2088 0.1149 0.3275 1.0000     
ROA 0.2950 -0.0346 -0.0304 -0.0979 0.0620 0.0075 1.0000    
CFO 0.2197 -0.0134 -0.1367 0.2775 0.2216 0.1612 -0.0070 1.0000   
Tf -0.0769 0.4538 0.2563 0.0702 -0.094 -0.1271 -0.0157 -0.0187 1.0000  
VOLT -0.0374 0.0731 0.0492 0.0078 0.0490 -0.1171 0.0180 -0.0510 0.1178 1.0000 
Correlation between debt maturity, Sale, MV,CSUF, ROA, CFO shows a weak uphill (positive) linear relationship, suggesting that debt maturity 
and all these variable tend to decrease or increase together. 
While all other variables show a weak downhill (negative) linear relationship, which indicate that when one variable increase other variable 
decrease. 
Estimation results for equation 4 are presented in table 9. (Muti and Pfaffermayr 2011)Husman,  (Breusch and Pagan1980) Lagrange multiplier 
study indicate that OLS regression is most suitable for that particular study. As per OLS regression, results indicate that the total number of 
observations is 480. The Prob> chi2 value for fowling model is 0.0000 which is less than the 0.05 so it is found that the model is significant and 
correct. As per r-squared value 34.1% variations in Maturity is explained by following independent variables. 
Coefficient of corporate transparency is show positive relationship, suggesting that when (Tp) change by 1% leverage increase by 0.0430%, which 
specify that more transparency increase leverage. Coefficient value of family firm also shows positive relationship with leverage which specifies 
that 1% change in family firms increase leverage by 0.122%.Which reveals that more transparency in family firm leads family firm more toward 
leverage 
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Interaction of family firm and transparency (FF x Tp) coefficient also show positive relationship which specify that when transparency increase 
in family firms financial structure of family firm more move toward debt then equity. While its individual regression shows insignificant ‘p’ value 
which indicates that another mediator variable affects it which makes their results significant in regression model.While all other variable result 
are consistent as prior studies (Chen, Dasgupta, and Yu 2014). 
Table 9: Shows   effect of Family firm on the relationship between Leverage and corporate Transparency 
VARIABLES LEVE LEVE LEVE LEVE LEVE LEVE LEVE LEVE LEVE 
Tp 0.0430*** 0.0125        
 (0.0131) (0.0107)        
Tf -0.0669***  -0.00823       
 (0.0180)  (0.0147)       
FF 0.122***   0.113***      
 (0.0351)   (0.0348)      
MATU 0.162    -0.0978     
 (0.114)    (0.119)     
MV -0.113***     -0.0970***    
 (0.00882)     (0.00734)    
Sale 0.0483***      -0.0206**   
 (0.00896)      (0.00860)   
VOLT -0.000144       -0.00707  
 (0.0128)       (0.0143)  
ROA -0.101***        -0.125*** 
 (0.0247)        (0.0251) 
Constant 1.809*** 0.450*** 0.462*** 0.371*** 0.467*** 2.641*** 0.934*** 0.466*** 0.482*** 
 (0.219) (0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0305) (0.0160) (0.166) (0.199) (0.0218) (0.0152) 
Observations 480 480 480 480 474 480 480 480 480 
R-squared 0.341 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.268 0.012 0.001 0.049 
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Table 10: Correlation, effect of Family firm on the relationship between Leverage 
and corporate Transparency 
 
 LEVE Tp Tf FF MATU MV Sale VOLT ROA 
LEVE 1.0000         
Tp 0.0582 1.0000        
Tf -0.0221 0.6511 1.0000       
FF 0.1538 -0.1058 0.2620 1.0000      
MATU -0.0597 -0.0553 -0.0633 -0.1058 1.0000     
MV -0.5022 -0.1399 -0.1102 -0.2100 0.1526 1.0000    
Sale -0.1090 -0.2329 -0.1451 -0.2191 0.0615 0.5277 1.0000   
VOLT -0.0181 0.0881 0.1298 0.0037  0.0342 -0.0240 -0.0621 1.0000  
ROA -0.2077 -0.0317 -0.0156 -0.0532 0.1721 0.0934 0.0403 0.0467 1.0000
Correlation between debt maturity, Sale, MV,MATU, ROA, CFO shows a weak down 
hill (negative) relationship, suggesting that LEVE and all these variable tend to decrease 
or increase differently. 
 While all other variables show a weak uphill (positive) linear relationship , which 
indicate that when one variable increase other variable also increase. 
H1 
Family Firms and non-family firms are different from each other’s. 
Summary statistics for Family firms and Nonfamily firms, including mean and standard 
deviation shows the difference between these two. Results indicated that Family firms 
have high (leverage) ratio and lower (maturity) as compare to Nonfamily firms. Further 
table indicate that family firms have more (transparency) and (BIND) as compare to 
non-family firms, indicated that family firms are more information asymmetry and have 
more independent directors. These results are very similar to (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) 
result. 
H2 
Family firms and non-family firms have different financial structure.  
Summary statistics for Family firms and Nonfamily firms, including mean and standard 
deviation shows the difference between these two. Results also indicated that Family 
firms had high (leverage) ratio and lower (maturity) as compare to Nonfamily firms. 
Which indicate that family firms have more long term debts and for financing it more 
rely on debt rather thanequity. 
H3 
There is no relationship between transparency and financial structure of Family firm     
Result specifies that there is a relationship between transparency and financial structure 
of family firms, moreover family firms have more debt maturity and low transparency 
which suggested that family firms are more relying on long-term debt and there is 
chance of expropriation in family firms due to less transparency. Following results are 
in accordance with the results of previous research (Anderson et al 2012). 
Further result indicates that transparency increase leverage ratio which suggests that the 
firm which is more transparent would have more leverage. Family firm results also 
shows positive relationship with leverage which indicates that family firms have more 
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leverage and less rely on equity financing. 
H4 
There is a positive relationship between transparency and debt maturity of Family firm. 
Coefficient of transparency is show negative relationship with maturity, suggesting that 
when (Tp) increases debt maturity decreases which specifies that more transparency 
decrease debt maturity. 
H5 
For a given level of transparency, family firms have higher debt maturity and               
lower leverage ratio. Above results indicate that for a given level of transparency family 
firms have higher debt maturity and more leverage ratio, which suggested that family 
firms are more rely on long term debt and family firms financial structure are more 
toward debt then equity.   
Conclusion 
Significant existing literature indicates that agency cost and information environment 
affect the financial choices of non-family firm (Chen, Dasgupta, and Yu 2014), while 
there is a little evidence about the financial choices of family firm. This existing study 
fills that gap and tells how financing choices of family firms are different from non-
family firms. Statistical summary results define how family firms are different from 
non-family firms in term of their mean and standard deviation values, further results 
indicate that family firmsandnon-family firms have different financial structure in term 
of maturity and leverage. Relationship between Family firms, Maturity and 
Transparency specify that Family firms have more debt maturity and low transparency 
which suggest that family firms are more relying on long-term debt and there is chance 
of expropriation in family firms due to less transparency. Following results are in 
accordance with the results of previous research (Anderson et al 2012). Moreover, 
results specified that for any given level of transparency the financial structure of family 
firm is different from non-family firm.  
 Moreover results indicate that transparency increase leverage ratio which suggests that 
the firm which is more transparent would have more leverage. Family firm results also 
shows positive relationship with leverage which indicates that family firms have more 
leverage and less rely on equity financing. Interaction of family firms and transparency 
(FF x transparency) also indicate that when transparency increase in family firms 
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